Denver Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 4

Article 6

January 1973

The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for
Regression - Torts - Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 130-11-1 to -17
Rodney R. Patula

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Rodney R. Patula, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression - Torts - Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 130-11-1 to -17, 49 Denv. L.J. 567 (1973).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COMMENT
THE COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT:
A PRESCRIPTION FOR REGRESSION - TORTS - COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971)
INTRODUCTION

F

OR centuries the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity has insulated both the individual public official and
the corporate personality of state and local governments from
suit. Under this doctrine the state and its political subdivisions
might be sued only if they consented to such suit, and until
recently this requirement of consent was an absolute maxim
of law. In its earliest application in English common law,1 the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the recovery of a plaintiff aggrieved by a sovereign defendant in either tort or contract 2 solely because of the defendant's public character. The
merits of the cause of action and the equitable considerations
which might favor compensation were irrelevant.
Such injustice persisted with the doctrine's appearance in
American jurisprudence. 3 But American courts were quick to
recognize these injustices, and soon began to modify the doctrine's operation in an effort to mitigate its harsh consequences.
Two approaches to such modification emerged. The first was
to define the sovereignty of public entities in such a way as to
exclude some portion of the entities' functions from the general class of sovereign activity. Thus, where an actionable harm
was caused by a public employee while engaged in an activity
which, though "public" by definition, was not deemed "sovereign," the public entity could not avail itself of sovereign
immunity,4 but was instead held liable under the theory of
respondeat superior.' The second approach was to construct
1 For a review of the historical development of sovereign immunity in

English common law, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
2 This comment will deal primarily with immunity from a suit in tort.
Colorado, like most states, negatived its immunity doctrine as to contract actions under the fiction of "inferred consent" (the court inferred
the government's consent to suit from the act of contracting itself). See
Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo.
19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957). See also Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
3 The evolution of sovereign immunity in early American common law is
treated in depth by Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
4 See subsection I.A., What Is Sovereign? pp. 571-75 infra.
5 See generally Williams, Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of

the Servant, 72 L.Q. REV. 522 (1956).
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an elaborate fiction by which the public entity was said to have
"waived" immunity or to have "consented" to the suit. Such
consent was inferred from the purchase of liability insurance
by the governmental defendant. 6 Unfortunately, these common
law exceptions to sovereign immunity proved difficult to administer as the courts found little guidance in reason to distinguish the sovereign from the nonsovereign act. Instead of
eradicating the injustice of sovereign immunity, the exceptions
merely compounded the injustice with confusing distinctions.
By the mid-20th century the uncertainty of the immunity doctrine's application under these exceptions had become a judicial
nightmare, and abrogation of the doctrine seemed assured.
Between 1942 and 1945, New York became the first state to
begin piecemeal legislation to take sovereign immunity out of
the state's common law;7 several other states followed." In
March 1971, Colorado joined this growing minority with the
supreme court's opinions in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners' and two companion cases.'" By these decisions the
court emphatically erased all features of governmental immunity from Colorado's common law. Further, the decisions
sounded a challenge to the Colorado General Assembly to
provide for the financial protection of public entities which
now stood nakedly open to suit. In the court's view this might
have been accomplished by the purchase of liability insurance
or by the legislative reinstatement of sovereign immunity.'1
The general assembly chose the latter alternative by enacting
the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.12
Although the Act does restore sovereign immunity as a
general rule in suits against the state and its political subdivisions, 13 it still embraces the central policy considerations
of Evans, as indicated in the Act's Declaration of Policy:
It is recognized by the general assembly that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are often immune from suit for injuries suffered by
private persons, is, in some instances, an inequitable doctrine.14
6 See subsection I.B., What Is Consent? pp. 575-76 infra.
7 The process of abrogation including legislative and judicial interaction
is reviewed in Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363, 1391 (1954).
s A list of these states is found in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs,
482 P.2d 968, 969 n.1, 972 n.12 (Colo. 1971).
9 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971).
10 Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 482 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1971); Proffitt v.
State, 482 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1971). The opinion rendered by the court
in Evans is conclusive as to these decisions as well.
11 The court outlined these alternatives in Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (Colo. 1971).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971).
13 Id.§ 130-11-6(1) (a).
14 Id. § 130-11-2.
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However, in spite of this recognition, the general assembly has
failed to accomplish its primary objective - to provide the
courts with a realistic approach to governmental liability.
Instead, as this comment will demonstrate, the new Act is a
regression which will force the courts back into the injustice
and uncertainty of pre-Evans common law. Before the full
impact of this regression may be appreciated, however, the
reader must first understand the nature of sovereign immunity
and the injustice and uncertainty incident to its application
under common law prior to Evans.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Pai-EvansDocTnm
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity unfolded in American cases, a set of universal rules grew up for defining the
extent of immunity enjoyed by both the public entity and its
employees.' 5 In the context of tort law, the doctrine protected
most governmental employees from liability for injury resulting
from "foreseeable conduct" within their "scope of employment. '16 The employee would be held personally liable only
if his conduct exceeded this scope of employment. Even the
traditional limits of respondeat superior defining scope of
employment were expanded beyond conventional principles
as the foreseeability of official conduct came to encompass
more and more behavior previously considered outside the
scope of employment. 7
The public entity's liability under this formulation was
truly a situation of "heads, I win -tails,
you lose." If the
wrong committed by the public employee was caused by conduct foreseeably within the scope of employment, then sovereign
immunity would protect both the public entity and its employee.
If the conduct was found to be outside the scope of employment, then the employee might be held personally liable, but
clearly his employer would not be liable under any theory of
respondeat superior.' s
In Colorado, immunity was first recognized in the 1893
decision, Board of County Commissioners v. Bish,19 which
shielded local governments from suit. Immunity for the state
15 Both the general rules and particular idiosyncrasies of various state

formulations are found inLeflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 7, at 1391.
See W. PRossE R, LAW OF Toirrs §§ 131-32 (4th ed. 1971).
1'Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 TAN. L. REV. 263
(1937).
16

18 The classical statement of these two rules in federal common law is

Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884). Colorado's common law
on this point is reviewed in Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609

(1960).
19 18 Colo. 474, 33 P. 184 (1893).
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was established 2 years later when the supreme court decided
In re Constitutionality of Substitute for Senate Bill No. 83,20
better known as the Benedictine Sisters case. Without discussing
the justification for the doctrine, the court simply stated:
We recognize the doctrine that, without ccnstitutional or legislative authority, the state in its sovereign capacity cannot be sued.
No such authority exists in this state. This being so, no liability

may be, can be enforced
upon contract or tort, if any there 21
against the state in any of its courts.
In the Benedictine Sisters case, the appellant challenged
the constitutionality of sovereign immunity, at least as it affected property interests. The challenge was premised upon
the Colorado constitutional provision that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation. '22 Since the appellant's property had
been taken incident to a public works project and since no
compensation, just or otherwise, had been received, the claim
appeared sound. The supreme court, however, avoided this
compelling constitutional argument by ruling in favor of the
state on grounds of sovereign immunity.23 The constitutional
validity of a doctrine which so plainly interfered with the
exercise of this right to just compensation was an issue virtualy ignored by the court.
The court continued to ignore this issue for nearly half a
century. Finally, in its 1939 decision, State v. Colorado Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co.,2 4 the supreme court ruled that legislative
consent to sue was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction
over actions against the state. This was so because the extent
and nature of public liability was a matter vested to the exclusive concern of the legislature. 25 The court felt incompetent
to "legislate" such compensation for the plaintiff, as this would
clearly violate the separation of powers clause. Moreover, the
court felt powerless to compel the legislature to affirmatively
perform its own duty, for such a mandate was profoundly different from declaring a positive act of the legislature unconstitutional.
This reasoning ignored the obvious competence vested in
the judiciary to declare the taking of property without just
20

21
22

23
24
25

21 Colo. 69, 39 P. 1088 (1895).
Id. at 72, 39 P. at 1089.
COLO.CONST. art. II,

§ 15.

21 Colo. at 72, 39 P. at 1089.
104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939).
This rationale was used often in early federal common law. See United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
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compensation, in and of itself, an act beyond the constitutional
authority of either legislative or executive power. Ultimately,
the Colorado Supreme Court surrendered to this logic in Boxberger v. State Highway Department.2 1 In this case the court
carried the constitutional argument to its logical conclusion
by finding sufficient grounds for jurisdiction over suits against
the state in the constitution itself:
This judicial power is conferred by [the constitution] and we see
no reason to invoke a different doctrine as to remedy for the
citizen whose property is wrongfully held by the sovereign or
any other source of imposition. The rights of a citizen remain
the same whether they collide with an individual or the government, and judicial tribunals were wisely established to correct such matters without the individual being relegated to the
position of no other remedy except to appeal to a legislature,
maybe to no avail, as all the people, or the citizens, are, in fact,
the sovereign under our desirable form of government. 27

Boxberger established nothing more than the unconstitutionality
of sovereign immunity when raised as a defense to actions
seeking enforcement of constitutional prohibitions against the
uncompensated taking of property. As to all other actions,
however, sovereign immunity remained an absolute rule.
This exception to sovereign immunity was the product of
a much larger process, one by which the absolute quality
of the immunity doctrine had begun to erode. The courts in
most jurisdictions 28 were retreating from the purist conception
of sovereign immunity and embarking upon the long climb
toward abrogation of the doctrine. As mentioned earlier,29 this
process utilized two primary avenues of retreat, one requiring
distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign acts and the
other calling for waiver of immunity where the public entity
had procured liability insurance. Each of these will be discussed
in turn.
A.

What Is Sovereign?

The fundamental injustice of sovereign immunity was that
the plaintiff was barred from recovery for an otherwise actionable harm merely because the defendant was a public
and not a private institution. This injustice was accentuated by
the personal immunity of the public employee responsible for
26 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952).
27
28

Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008.
South Carolina was the only jurisdiction which consistently refused to
find any common law liability. See Irvine v. City of Greenwood, 89
S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).

29 See pp. 567-68 supra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

the plaintiff's harm, 30 since the possibility of an alternative defendant was thereby negatived.
By the mid-19th century the courts began to respond to
these injustices by the development of the famous (or infamous)
governmental-nongovernmental distinction.3 New York was
first to carve out such an exception to sovereign immunity in
the landmark case, Bailey v. City of New York.3 2 The plaintiff
complained of damage incurred because of the city's allegedly
negligent construction of a dam across a river. The court distinguished between the "private" and "public" activities which
are carried on by government. Because the construction of a
dam was deemed "private" or "proprietary," the defendant
was unable to escape liability under the veil of the immunity
doctrine.
Similarly, in McCarthy v. City of Syracuse,31 the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that those duties of public officials,
though imposed by law, which were "ministerial" in nature were
not the same as duties incident to the general authority of the
sovereign. Rather, they were duties which were somehow not
of a governmental character, and if injury resulted from the
negligent performance of such duties, the municipal corporation and its officials could be held liable in tort.
The lead of New York was followed by Wisconsin, 34 Rhode
Island, 35 and Oregon. 36 Then in 1904, Colorado adopted the New
York rule for public liability in the decision of Veraguth v.
City of Denver.3 7 The court, speaking of municipal corporations,
declared:
One class of its powers is of a public and general character, to
be exercised in virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty delegated to it for the welfare and protection of its inhabitants; the
other relates only to special or private corporate purposes, for the
accomplishment of which it acts, not through its public officers
as such, but through agents or servants employed by it. In the
former case its functions are political and governmental, and no
liability attaches to it either for nonuser or misuser of a power;
Some states limited personal immunity to "superior officers." These
states included California, Utah, Arizona, and some New England states.
See, e.g., Dawson v. Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957).
31 The terms "governmental" and "nongovernmental" are used here
generically. Some cases refer to a public-private test, others to governmental-proprietary distinctions.
32 3 N.Y. 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842).
3346 N.Y.S. 194 (App. Div. 1871).
34
Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 14 Am. R. 760 (1873).
35 Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R.I. 141, 23 Am. R. 434 (1875).
36 Wagner v. City of Portland, 40 Ore. 389, 60 P. 985 (1900).
37 19 Colo. App. 473, 76 P. 539 (1904).
30
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while in the latter, it stands upon the same footing with a private
corporation, and will be held to the same responsibility with a
38
private corporation for injuries resulting from its negligence.

In theory, the rationale supporting such distinctions rested
in the court's conception of sovereignty which was seemingly
designed to permit recovery by the plaintiff whenever possible,
but precluding such recovery whenever the sovereign power
of government might be "usurped" or interfered with.3 9 To
grant a remedy against the state when its injury-producing
activity was governmental (i.e., sovereign per se) would constitute the imposition of a standard of conduct upon the functioning of sovereign authority. This suggested a form of external
control or regulation over the exercise of sovereignty. Such a
remedy was then clearly improper.4 0 But if the activity was
merely proprietary or nongovernmental, no usurpation of sovereign power would be effected by permitting a private cause
of action, and governmental immunity in such cases was less
essential to the smooth operation of government.
Similarly, the discretionary-ministerial test, applied to the
public officials' personal liability, was seen as a distinction be-

tween "sovereign" and "less-than sovereign" acts. This distinction rested on the theoretical assumption that a public employee engaged in the determination of sovereign policy must
have the freedom of action to effectively exercise sovereign
authority, hence he was said to act in his own discretion as a
sovereign agent. To avoid usurpation of, or interference with,
this sovereign agency, the employee was held personally immune. In contrast, the public employee whose acts were classified as ministerial was not immune from suit because he was
engaged in the implementation of sovereign policy, and such
implementation was considered inherently less sovereign or
perhaps less necessary to the unhampered exercise of sovereignty. 41 In this manner the discretionary-ministerial distinction was treated as a subset of the more general governmentalnongovernmental test.
This reasoning worked well in theory; yet in practice the
3s Id. at 477, 76 P. at 540-41.
39 This "usurpation" and interference rationale was used in Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., i337 U.S. 682 (1949).
40 This reasoning is tersely embodied in a remark by Justice Holmes: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907).
41 This distinction between determination and implementation of sovereign policy is set forth in Note, 38 Micr. L. Rzv. 1344 (1940).
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courts found substantial difficulty in arriving at general rules
for making these distinctions meaningful. The difficulty arose
from the interactive character of the distinctions. Conclusions
under one distinction depended, in part, upon conclusions
reached under the other. The court first decided whether the
public entity was, with respect to the harm-producing activity,
involved in a governmental or nongovernmental activity. If
governmental, the public entity was immune, irrespective of the
personal liability of its employee. 42 The employee was personally liable then only if his conduct was ministerial or fell outside the scope of employment. 43 If the public employer was
classified as nongovernmental, it was generally subject to liability and its employee could not avail himself of his employer's immunity. 44 However, if the employee committed a tortious
wrong by conduct characterized as discretionary, he was personally immune and the public entity could vicariously assert
his immunity in its own defense.45 This meant that the public
entity was subject to liability only when all of three conditions
were met- (1) its general activity was deemed proprietary
and not governmental, (2) its employee's injury-producing conduct was ministerial and not discretionary in character, and
(3) its employee's conduct, consistent with the doctrine of re46
spondeat superior, was within the scope of his employment.
The complexity of this formulation was compounded by
the difficulty in defining such terms as governmental or non47
governmental function and discretionary or ministerial acts.
The Colorado case law representing this rule is reviewed in Malvermia
Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951).
43 See City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 7, 351 P.2d 826, 829
(1960). The "scope of employment" test should be distinguished from
the immunity tests since an agent would be personally liable, and the
principal not liable, for torts committed by the agent's conduct outside
the scope of employment, irrespective of the public or private character
of that employment.
44 See City & County of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 P. 590 (1905).
42

45
46

47

See Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 P. 1040 (1913). See also W.
PRoSSER, supra note 16, §§ 131-32.
Although the distinctions between these three conditions were often
blurred or not explicitly recognized, the textual statement is a valid
summary of the requirement to find liability. If any one of the elements (governmental character, discretionary employee activity, employee action within the scope of employment) was recognized as
missing, the public entity escaped liability.
The Colorado case law in this area is typical of the confusion incident
to attempted distinctions between these terms. Compare City & County
of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1101 (1957) with Williams
v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (governmentalnongovernmental distinction applied to operation of public facilities).
Also compare Moses v. City & County of Denver, 89 Colo. 609, 5 P.2d
581 (1931) with City & County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295
(discretionary-ministerial distinction applied).
P. 788 (1931)
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The finding of a "general statutory grant" authorizing particular functions of government was used as a criterion for deciding
the governmental-nongovernmental issue.48 But the vagueness
of this criterion made it all but useless for anything but the
most extreme cases. 49 The ministerial-discretionary distinction
did little to diminish the confusion, because in most jurisdictions it operated only after a finding that the public entity
was engaged in a governmental activity.50 Mr. Justice Traynor,
in reviewing the California rule on public liability, observed:
[The immunity doctrine] has become riddled with exceptions,
both legislative and judicial, and the exceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality. Some who are injured by
governmental agencies can recover, others cannot: one injured
while attending a community theater in a public park may recover, but one injured in a children's playground may not .... 51

B. What Is Consent?
In addition to the interpretive difficulties created by the
governmental-nongovernmental distinction, the courts encountered more problems in accomplishing selective waiver of sovereign immunity by other means, most notably through the consent proviso of the doctrine. Since the immunity doctrine permitted suits against the state and its political subdivisions whenever these entities consented to such actions, it seemed logical
enough to create exceptions to immunity by expanding the
meaning of such consent. Traditionally, this consent required
either legislative waiver of immunity or voluntary submission
of the public entity to the jurisdiction of the court wherein
the complaint had been filed. But in a series of cases beginning
with an Illinois decision, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District No. 302,52 a curious new method of consent was devised.
Where the public entity procured any liability insurance, it was
deemed to have waived its claim to sovereign immunity to the
extent of the policy limits. 53 This applied as to all actions
brought against the governmental entity. Thus the governmental unit which purchased insurance to cover potential torts
48

See McIntosh v. City & County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337
(1936).
49 See Abeyta v. City & County of Denver, 165 Colo. 58, 437 P.2d 67
(1968) (discussing the governmental-nongovernmental distinction in
the context of the city's exercise of police power under a general statutory grant).
50 This includes Colorado. See City & County of Denver v. Maurer, 47
Colo. 209, 106 P. 875 (1910).
51 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961)
(abrogation of sovereign immunity in California)
(court's citations omitted).
52 18 Ill.
2d 11. 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
53 Id.
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arising from nongovernmental activities found that it had partially waived its immunity as to all activitiesincluding those
which were heretofore clearly governmental and immune, ab54
sent the insurance.
In the final analysis, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
under the governmental-nongovernmental and discretionaryministerial distinctions was a veritable judicial quagmire. Even
a conceptually separate exception to immunity, such as the
insurance-waiver approach just outlined, became impossible to
administer effectively because of these distinctions. They were
the culprit, the ultimate cause of uncertainty and confusion
in the common law. 55 Moreover, the two tests failed to answer
the other critical need in the law of sovereign immunity, namely
the need for greater justice. Whereas prior to the governmentalnongovernmental and discretionary-ministerial distinctions, an
aggrieved party might not recover for harm he suffered because
the defendant was a public entity, now a plaintiff's recovery
depended upon the general character of the tortfeasor's function. Neither of these criteria of liability bore any rational
relationship to the actual "culpability" of the defendant. Ultimately, the denial of a just demand for compensation under
the new tests was as bitter a pill to swallow as under the
56
original sovereign immunity doctrine.
II.

ABROGATION OF THE DOCTRINE:

THE Evans

DECISION

By the time New York began to progressively uproot its
immunity doctrine during the early 1940's, 57 nearly every American jurisdiction had experimented with some form of selective
waiver of immunity. By the late 1950's it was quite apparent
that these experiments were failures. The problems which
plagued the governmental-nongovernmental and discretionaryministerial distinctions had become universal. Abrogation
seemed inevitable.
New York stood as a lone pioneer in the field of abrogation
until 1957, when Florida repealed its immunity doctrine in
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.58 This was a wrongful death
54

Although Colorado did not follow this approach, it would have been
possible under the insurance-waiver provisions of CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 123-30-11 (Supp. 1965).
55 Justice Frankfurter offered his evaluation of the governmental-nongovernmental distinction in his majority opinion in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
56 An excellent comment on the justice of these common law tests is found
in Gellhorn & Shenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 722 (1947).
57 See p. 568 supra.
58 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).

COMMENT

action brought by the widow of a prisoner killed during a
fire in a locked and unattended jail. In permitting recovery
the Supreme Court of Florida explicitly limited its denial of
immunity to municipal corporations:
We ... feel that the time has arrived to declare this doctrine
anachoristic [sic] not cnly to our system of justice but to our
traditional concepts of democratic government .... Affirmatively we hold that a municipal corporation may be held liable
for the torts of police officers under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 59
A number of other jurisdictions followed Florida with judicial decisions and legislative enactments, varying from mere
expansion of previous waiver rules to total abrogation of immunity."' Then, in March 1971, Colorado became the eighteenth
state to severely alter governmental immunity in favor of
6 2
the
liability. ' In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners,
plaintiff brought an action in negligence for an injury sustained in a fall allegedly caused by defective steps of the El
Paso County Courthouse. The trial court ruled that governmental immunity precluded any recovery, and the plaintiff
brought an appeal on the sole issue of whether immunity in
such cases should continue in Colorado. With two dissents the
supreme court ruled that such immunity should no longer
operate. Mr. Justice Groves remarked in his majority opinion:
Obviously, there is ample authority to continue application of the
doctrine, and there is an abundance of authority to overturn it.
that the doctrines are causing too
A majority of us simply think
3
great a degree of injustice.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Day and Kelley are substantially aimed at the lack of judicial restraint evidenced by
the majority in overruling principles which the court had "pro4
nounced and repronounced . . . through the past many years."
The dissenters emphatically felt the majority had overstepped
the limits of its competence and that the general assembly was
the only proper forum in which to abrogate governmental im59 Id. at 132.
60 For a review

of these legislative and judicial interactions see Van

Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963). For more recent developments, including a proposal by the American Bar Association and the

Administrative Conference of the United States to amend the Administrative Procedure Act so as to eliminate the remaining vestiges of federal sovereign immunity see K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE

§§ 27.00 to .10 (Supp. 1971).

61 The first 17 states are listed in Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 482
62
63
64

P.2d 968, 969 n.1, 972 n.12 (Colo. 1971).
482 P.2d 968.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 973.
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munity. However, Justice Groves provides an adequate rebuttal
to this accusation of "judicial legislating. '65 In recalling that
the doctrine was originally judge-made, Justice Groves comments: "the effect of this opinion . . . is simply to undo what
this court has done and leave the situation where it should
have been at the beginning, or at least should be now: in the
hands of the General Assembly .... "66
Although the majority recognizes the proper role of the
legislature, and indeed invites legislative action,6 7 it also recognizes the simple fact that what is "created" by the judiciary
may be dismantled by it. It is true that in the more than 75
years since Colorado adopted immunity in Bish, the legislature
may have acted numerous times in ways demonstrating a tacit
recognition of governmental immunty, but never had such bare
reliance bordered on codification of the doctrine.
Despite the variety of arguments, historical and contemporary,6 offered by the majority in support of abrogating immunity, the ultimate logic of the Evans opinion seemingly
turns on the court's recognition of the immunity doctrine's
obsolescence:
Some courts and writers, while not wishing to state that the
older decisions were wrong when decided, take the position that
the intervening vicissitudes of society have necessitated a change
in the law. We agree with these points of view. 69

By Evans, the supreme court set the stage for the general assembly's response.

III. FROM REASON To REGRESSION
A.

The Legislative History of the Act

In Evans and its two companion cases, the Colorado Supreme Court delayed the prospective effect of their decisions
until after June 30, 1972, to permit the legislature adequate time
to act in response to the decision: "If the General Assembly
wishes to restore sovereign immunity and governmental immunity in whole or in part, it has the authority to do so."17 0
65 For an evaluation of "judicial legislating" in those jurisdictions which
were inthe fore of abrogation, see Littlefield, Stare Decisis, Prospective
Overruling, and Judicial Legislation in the Context of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 56 (1964).
66 482 P.2d at 971.
6
7 Id.at 972.
68 These arguments included

a discussion of the ancient but distorted
maxim, "the king can do no wrong." This autocratic maxim's hostility
with American political ideology is examined in Barry, The King Can
Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349 (1925).

69 482 P.2d at 970.
70

Id. at 972.
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Additionally, the court sought to provide the state with sufficient time to secure the liability insurance needed until the
71
legislature might act.
The general assembly had been preparing for several years
to face the question of governmental immunity and responded
promptly to the Evans decision. From reference to the Colorado
Legislative Council's report, "Governmental Liability in Colorado ,'"' published in 1968, it is evident that the legislature's
response could have taken any of three forms.
First, the state and its political subdivisions might have
been made subject to open-ended liability, with no greater legal
protection than a private defendant. There were two ways to
accomplish this. One was to do nothing, thereby permitting
Evans to stand with its clear abrogation of all public immunity.
The other way was to codify Evans in a manner similar to the
New York model, 7 3 which provides for governmental liability
as though the government were a private person, but which
does not enumerate exceptions to this general waiver of immunity as in the case of the Federal Tort Claims Act.7 4 Both of
these approaches were rejected, most probably because they
promised to bring financial havoc to all levels of government,
and this fear outweighed the obvious equity of total abrogation.
The second form the Act might have taken would have
mimicked statutes of Illinois 7 and California, 711 the former defining immunity for certain governmental bodies and liability
for others, and the later cataloging every function of each
governmental agency as a function either immune from or
subject to liability. These formulations were also rejected, perhaps because they constituted mere codification of the dysfunctional governmental-nongovernmental distinction which so many
77
state judiciaries and legislatures had long ago denounced.
Further, the Illinois and California models emphasized the prior
inconsistencies of their judiciaries' governmental-nongovernmental distinction and sought to improve on this case law
71

Id.

72 Colorado Legislative Council, Governmental Liability in Colorado, Research Publication No. 134, Nov. 1968 [hereinafter cited as Legislative
Council]. The council studied public liability, compiling a' wealth of
information about the experiences of other states which had abrogated
immunity, as well as past problems specific to Colorado case and
statutory law.
73N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW §§ 50 to 51-a (McKinney 1965).
7428U.S.C.§§2680(a)-(k) (1954).
75 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-100 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
76 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815, 815.2 (West 1969).
77 See pp. 574-77 supra.
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version, rather than to attack the primary injustice of the
immunity doctrine itself.
The third option available to the general assembly was to
overrule Evans and reinstate immunity in either its pre-Evans
"judicial form" or in a new legislative form which would
modify the troublesome governmental-nongovernmental and discretionary-ministerial tests. This latter alternative was ultimately selected by the Colorado legislature, and the Act, which
79
is closely patterned after the statutes of Utah78 and Michigan,
reaffirms immunity as the general rule and then provides for
a number of exceptions.
The Provisions of the Act
Under the Act, general immunity extends to all forms of
public entities including any "kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of the state organized pursuant to law."80 The immunity doctrine continues in its historical
shield of any public employee, "whether or not compensated,
elected or appointed," 8' and the common law "scope of employment" standard is codified by the Act, with independent con82
tractors excluded from the class of protected individuals.
B.

The Act specifies that "[a] public entity shall be immune
from liability in all claims for injury which are actionable in
' 3
The exceptort except as otherwise provided in this section."
public
permit
tions to such immunity specified in this section
liability under the following conditions:
(b) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased
by such publice [sic] entity, by a public employee, while in the
course of his employment, except emergency vehicles operating
within the provisions of section 13-5-4 (2) and (3). C.R.S. 1963;
(c) The operation of any public hospital, penitentiary, reformatory, or jail by such public entity, or a dangerous condition existing therein;
(d) A dangerous condition of any public building;

(e)

A dangerous condition which interferes with the

movement of traffic on the traveled portion and shoulders or
curbs of any public highway, road, street, or sidewalk within

the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any highway
which is a part of the federal interstate highway system or the
federal primary highway system, or of any paved highway
which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of
any paved highway which is a part of the state highway system,

on that portion of such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -15 (1961).
(1967).
79MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.996(101) to (115)
78

80 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

81 Id. § 130-11-3 (3).
82 Id.
83 Id.§ 130-11-6(1) (a).

130-11-3(2) (Supp. 1971).
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was designed and intended for public travel or parking thereon;

(f)

A dangerous condition of any public facility, except

roads and highways located in parks or recreation areas, public

parking facilities, and public transportation facilities maintained

by such public entity. Nothing in this paragraph (f) or in paragraph (e) of this subsection (1) shall be construed to prevent
a public entity from asserting the defense of sovereign immunity
to an injury caused by the natural condition of any unimproved

property, whether or not such property is located in a park or

recreation area, or highway, road, or street right-of-way;
(g) The operation and maintenance of any public water
facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power
such public entity, or a dangerfacility, or swimming facility by
84
ous condition existing therein.

In addition to these specific exceptions, a separate provision
of the Act waives sovereign immunity to the policy limits of
"
any liability insurance carried by the defendant-public entity. "
These exceptions would apparently create liability not only
for harms which previously were not actionable, but also for
those harms most commonly caused by employees of the state
and its subdivisions. No doubt this was the benevolent intent
of the general assembly. But when each exception is carefully
scrutinized, read in terms of other provisions of the Act, and
then compared to both Evans and the pre-Evans status of immunity, serious doubts as to the practical impact of the Act
must be entertained.
C. The Nonregressive Features of the Act
Before turning to the central theme of this comment, the
regressiveness of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act,
it is valuable to outline the nonregressive features of the Act.
For purposes of analysis, the waiver provisions may be
divided into four groups: (1) waiver for injuries" arising from
the negligent operation of motor vehicles, (2) waiver for injuries caused by the operation of certain public facilities, (3)
waiver for injuries caused by the presence of a dangerous condition in such facilities, and (4) waiver by insurance. Each of
these will be examined in turn.
1. Operation of a Motor Vehicle
The Act's first waiver of governmental immunity, that for
injuries resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle by a
public employee, T actually replaces prior statutory waiver for
-S4 Id.§§ 130-11-6(1) (b) to-6(1) (g).
85 Id. § 130-11-4.
86 "Injury" is defined in the Act as "death, injury to a person, damage
to or loss of property, of whatsoever kind, which would be actionable
in tort if inflicted by a private person." Id.§ 130-11-3(4).
87 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (b).
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injuries caused by the negligent operation of police, fire, and
health department vehicles.8 8 This new waiver covers a broader
range of risk-producing activities and retains immunity only
for certain emergency situations. 81* The waiver extends to all
vehicles including those owned or leased by the public entity.
The only possible limitation of this waiver provision stems
from the legislature's use of the common law phrase, "while in
the course of employment," to qualify the government's waiver
of immunity. But under the theories of "foreseeability" and
"implied authority," Colorado courts have tended to construe
"scope of employment" expansively, at least when such a construction favored the immunity of the public official."" If these
precedents are retained, such a construction will now favor the
liability of the public entity, and this first waiver provision
should then operate to increase the number of successful suits
brought by private plaintiffs.
2.

Operation of Public Facilities

Subsection (c) and (g) of the specific waiver clause of
the Act permit suits against the public entity for two distinct
classes of activity. The first is for injury arising from the
operation of public hospitals, penitentiaries, reformatories, or
jails. :"' The second is for injury caused by the operation of any
public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming
facility.92 The first group includes only facilities administered
under a specific grant of sovereign power and thus previously
immune as governmental activities under the common law
test.9 3 The second group includes only functions which were
held proprietary at common law and thus subject to liability.9 4
At first glance this would appear to broaden the bases
for public liability, but, as will be demonstrated below, these
gains are questionable.
3.

Dangerous Conditions

Potentially, the largest area of sovereign liability created
88

Id. § 13-10-1 (1963).

89 These emergency situations, liability therefor, dollar amount limits on

recovery, and provision for insurance are treated by COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 130-10-1 to -3 (1963).
90 The classic Colorado case on scope of employment is Comstock v. Bivens,
78 Colo. 107, 239 P. 869 (1925).
91CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-6(1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
92 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (g).
93 See Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960); City & County of
Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).
94 See Cerise v. Fruitvale Water & Sanitation Dist., 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d
462 (1963); City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 P. 1000
(1927); City & County of Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo. 209, 106 P. 875
(1910).
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by the Act depends upon the existence of a "dangerous condition" in some public facility or on some roadway. Five of
the six specific waiver provisions in the Act involve dangerous
conditions, and the importance of clearly understanding this
term cannot be overemphasized. Collapsing these five provisions
the state and its subdivisions are liable for all injuries arising
from the existence of a dangerous condition in any "public
hospital, penitentiary, reformatory, jail," 5 or any other "public
building,"9' 6 or "any public facility (except roads and highways
located in parks or recreation areas), public parking facilities
and public transportation facilities. ''197 The public entity is liable
as well for any injury caused by the presence of a dangerous
condition which interferes with the movement of traffic on the
traveled portion and shoulders or curbs of any public highway,
road, street, or sidewalk,"' and for injury caused by a dangerous
condition in any public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power,
or swimming facility.9 "
"Dangerous condition" is defined by the Act as existing
"where the physical condition of public facilities or the use
thereof constitutes a risk to the health or safety of the public,
which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been known to exist .... A dangerous condition should have been known to exist if it is established that
the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of
such a nature that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and
its dangerous character should have been discovered."'0'0 Moreover, the Act makes compulsory the proof of the time for which
the condition has existed. 0 1 Therefore, although a plaintiff
might establish, by other inferences, the existence of defendant's knowledge of the condition, the plaintiff may still be
barred from recovery for want of adequate proof as to the time
element.
Two other provisions may limit recovery under the Act for
injuries arising from dangerous conditions. First, a dangerous
condition must be evidenced by a defective condition which is
somehow at variance from the intended condition of the premises. Thus, a defect in design alone will be insufficient as a
95

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

96 Id.§ 130-11-6(1) (d).
97Id. § 130-11-6(1) (f).
9SId. § 130-11-6(1) (e).
99 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (g).
100 Id. § 130-11-3 (5)(a).

101 Id.

§ 130-11-6(1) (c)

(Supp.1971).
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grounds for waiver of immunity. 10 2 The second limitation excludes liability for injuries caused by the presence of a "danger03
ous condition on a public highway, road, street or sidewalk,'
or in a "public facility' ' 0 4 if such injury was caused by the
"natural condition of any unimproved property."'10 5 This limitation operates irrespective of any knowledge, actual or constructive, which the defendant has of the dangerous condition.
Additionally, two ambiguities in the Act with respect to
dangerous conditions promise to burden the courts. Both involve
the applicability of the immunity waivers to suits arising from
the existence of dangerous conditions on public roadways. First,
when the Act was originally introduced, it called for the waiver
of immunity wherever there existed "a dangerous condition on
any highway, road or street." 06 As enacted, however, the
statute applies only to "[a] dangerous condition which interferes with the movement of traffic on the traveled portion
and shoulder and curbs of any public highway, road, street or
sidewalk . . . ."oT The ambiguity stems from the phrase "interferes with the movement of traffic." Must an element of the
alleged tort be an interference with some legally recognized
interest of the plaintiff which is identical to an "interference
with the movement of traffic," or will any harm incident to
the presence of a dangerous condition which incidentally interferes with traffic be a harm that is actionable? Only substantial litigation will determine to what extent this phrase will
limit governmental liability.
The second ambiguity incident to the dangerous condition
waivers involves injuries occurring on roads and highways
within the exclusive control of counties. The legislative council in 1968 observed that counties were not liable for injuries
caused by defective conditions on thoroughfares, but that cities
were liable for such harm. 1 8 The council recommended that
this discrepancy be corrected. 109 The general assembly "addressed" this problem by ignoring it. The only statutory classification relevant to highways retains immunity for unpaved
302 Id. § 130-11-3 (5) (b).
303 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (e).
104 Id. § 130-11-6(1) (f).
105 Id.

106 H.R. No. 1047, 48th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. § 130-11-6(1) (e)

1971).

(Colo.

(emphasis
REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-6(1)(e) (Supp. 1971)
added).
108 See Legislative Council at 137. See also City of Denver v. Williams, 12
Colo. 475, 21 P. 617 (1889).
107CoLo.

109 See Legislative Council at 137.
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highways only. Immunity as to paved highways in cities is
waived, but there is no mention of paved highways over which
the county has control, ostensibly leaving the immunity of the
counties intact.1 10
4. Waiver by Insurance
The final form of waiver designated by the Act depends
upon the purchase of liability insurance by the public entity.
Recognizing that insurance is an adequate answer to the fears
that waiver of immunity will mean financial ruin to many governmental units, the legislature has provided for a general
waiver of immunity as to all injuries caused by any activity,
so long as the injury is one for which the insurance is applicable." ' Damages under this provision are limited to the policy
limits and are recoverable from the insurer only, although the
r2
insurer may not be named as a party defendant."
This general waiver, however, is also limited. The operation
of the waiver depends upon the purchase of insurance, and,
although the state is required to insure itself for losses caused
by conduct falling within any of the six specific waiver provisions in section 6 of the Act,' 1' insurance for all other losses
is merely permitted. 1 Moreover, at the time of this writing,
no insurance, compulsory or voluntary, has been obtained by
the state." '5 In short, this general waiver clause is little more
than a safety feature of the Act, a feature which mandates the
purchase of insurance to cover only those losses for which
immunity has already been waived elsewhere in the Act.
5. Summary
These four general classes of waiver-for the operation of
motor vehicles, for the operation of public facilities, for the
presence of dangerous conditions, and for the purchase of insurance- are all admirable attempts by the general assembly to
expand public liability. Some of the waivers are severely
limited; others are free from any true limitation. Some are ambiguous, promising substantial problems for the courts; others
are mere codifications of the common law, and the courts should
be well acquainted with their sometimes clouded legal significance. But the greatest potential limitation on the effective31WThis follows from the exclusivity of public liability as defined by the

Act. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 130-11-2, 130-11-6(1) (a)
311 Id. § 130-11-4(1).
112 Id. § 130-11-4(2).
13 Id. § 130-11-16.
114 Id. § 130-11-15.
115 See Denver Post, July 9, 1972, at 35, col. 4.

(Supp. 1971).
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ness of the Act has not yet been discussed. This limitation embraces the several provisions of the Act which require the
courts to retreat to the pre-Evans common law distinctions of
and discretionary-ministerial
governmental-nongovernmental
functions.
D. The Regressive Features of the Act
The Act provides "that the distinction for liability purposes
between governmental and proprietary functions should be
abolished.""' ; This, of course, is a policy wholly consistent with
Evans. However, the realization of this policy under the new
Act is a different matter altogether. The remainder of this
analysis demonstrates the failure of the Act to achieve this
statutory abolition.
1. Public "Operation" Versus Private "Operation"
As has already been mentioned, operation of certain public facilities and the presence of dangerous conditions in those
facilities comprise the bulk of immunity waivers under the Act.
The Act's specific definition of the term "operation" points to
the first regression:
"Operation" means the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in the exercise and performance of the powers,
duties, and functions vested in them by law with respect to the
public water, gas, sanitapurposes of any public hospital, jail,
117
tion, power, or swimming facility.

Recalling that absolute immunity is the rule and waiver the
exception,'" 8 those waivers for the specified "operations" become
effective in a rather curious manner. Where an injury occurs in
the operation of any of the enumerated facilities, the court must
decide if the act or omission is misfeasance or nonfeasance with
respect to any duty or power vested in them by the operation of
law. Since the phrase "vested in them by law" will include
direct statutory grants of authority, this definition of "operation" has an ironic effect. Whereas, at common law prior to
Evans, the public entity might be immune because the court
had made out a governmental function from the existence of
such a direct statutory grant of authority, 119 a similar finding
under the Act will lead to liability. In any event, to decide
whether the injury-producing activity complained of by a prospective plaintiff is part of an "operation," within the meaning
of the statute, the courts must again determine the public vis- 1"6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971).
117 Id. § 130-11-3(6) (a) (emphasis added).

See p. 580 & note 83 supra.
119 See p. 575 &note 48 supra.
118
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vis private nature of the activity and the legal status of the power or duty under which the activity was performed. The governmental-nongovernmental distinction with which the courts have
long expressed dissatisfaction, and which the general assembly
in this very Act declares abolished, 120 has once again become
the ultimate criterion for public liability.
2. Governmental "Operation" Versus Proprietary "Operations"
The legislative council's report, "Governmental Immunity in
Colorado," made the following recommendation in 1968:
The committee determined that the doctrine of immunity should
not apply to those activities which are determined to be proprietary in nature and that the liability of an entity when engaged in these functions should be determined as if it were a
private corporation or individual. These functions include but
are not limited to the following: water, sewer, trash, and21waste
disposal, electric and gas utilities, swimming pools, etc.1
Thus the council intended that all functions defined previously
at the common law as proprietary be subject to civil liability,
yet the general assembly waived immunity only for those functions listed by the council as examples of proprietary functions,
ignoring all other similar nongovernmental activities. This
poses severe problems for the courts. Although they might now
easily decide if a particular injury has been proximately caused
by a specified nongovernmental function, what is the result if
the injury-producing function is not enumerated in this waiver
provision? If the court simply assumes, under proper canons
of statutory construction,'1 22 that the list is exhaustive, or if it
reads literally the clause, "the state and its political subdivisions
. ..should be liable for their actions and those of their agents
only to such an extent, and subject to such conditions, as are
provided by this article,' 123 then the plaintiff's action must be
denied, and the courts are forced back into the injustice of preEvans sovereign immunity. If the courts decline to read the list
as exhaustive, they must then find some other criteria for judging whether immunity should or should not be applied. Without
the guidance of the legislature in the matter of such criteria,
and no such guidance is found in the Act, the courts must fall
20

§ 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971).
Legislative Council at 143 (emphasis added).
122 The canons of statutory construction require the court to treat al lists

1

COLO.REV. STAT. ANN.

121

123

as exhaustive unless a contrary legislative intention isapparent (expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of one excludes all
others). See People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal. 2d 503,
159 P.2d 641 (1945).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 130-11-2 (Supp. 1971). See also id. § 130-

11-6(1) (a).
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back on something akin to the original governmental-nongovernmental distinction.
Whichever of these two approaches is taken, the basic confusion, uncertainty, and inequity of the sovereign immunity doctrine must continue. It is still quite possible that parents of a
child killed because of negligent maintenance of a park will be
barred from recovery, but parents of a child drowned in an
adjacent swimming pool can recover to the limits set forth in
1 24
the Act.
3. Vicarious Immunity: The Final Regression
The clearly unfortunate feature of the Act, as described
above, once again requires the courts to utilize some publicversus-private distinction in determining governmental liability
for injuries arising from the operation of public facilities. But
even the potential of these problems is dwarfed by the regressive effect of one other provision in the Act.
The list of specific waivers of immunity prescribed in section 6 of the Act is immediately followed by a proviso:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver
of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or
failure to act, of a public employee where the act is the type
of act for which the public employee would be or heretofore has
12
been personally immune from liability. 5

Two constructions of this provision are possible. Fir;t, the
courts may reason that the public employee has som.-times
been personally immune from suit under the pre-Evan: com124

125

Limitations on judgments. (1) (a) The maximum amount that
may be recovered under this article shall be:
(b) For any injury to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars;
(c) For an injury to two or more persons in any single
occurrence, the sum of three hundred thousand dollars; except
that in such instance, no person may recover in excess of one
hundred thousand dollars.
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of
(2)
this section, if a public entity provides insurance coverage to
insure itself against all or any part of its liability for any injury, or to insure a public employee acting within the scope
of his employment against all or any part of his liability for
injury, and the insurance coverage is in an amount in excess
of the limits specified in subsection (1) of this section, then
recovery may be had in an amount not to exceed the limitations of insurance coverage; except that for this purpose selfinsurance as permitted in this article shall not be considered
insurance coverage and shall not increase the limits of liability
provided in subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit
the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under
article 1 of chapter 41, C.R.S. 1963, in an amount in excess of
amounts specifed in said article.
(4) A public entity shall not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages under this article.
Id. § 130-11-14 (Supp. 1971).
Id. § 130-11-6 (2) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
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mon law doctrine of sovereign immunity. If the agency of
government for which he works is engaged in a generally "governmental" function or if he is personally employed in a "discretionary" activity at the time the injury occurs, 12" he will be
immune from suit. In short, the public employee is personally
immune because "heretofore" he has been immune under sovereign immunity. Since the employee is personally immune
and since the state may avail itself of its employee's immunity,
the state may vicariously assert sovereign immunity. This is
clearly a circuitous construction as it goes directly to old sovereign immunity definitions to cloak the public entity with
sovereign immunity even in those cases where immunity has
now been expressly waived by the Act.
The second interpretation actually constitutes a potential
"saving construction." Since the state's immunity depends upon
its employee's immunity and since sovereign immunity in Colorado has a purportedly limited existence, the courts must now
more clearly separate the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
the doctrine of immunity for public employees.'12 7 Then some
new test for deciding whether the public employee is personally
immune must be devised independent of the pre-Evans sovereign
immunity rules. The legislature, however, by using terms such
as "heretofore . . .immune" has instructed the courts to look
to common law in order to fashion such a test. Some criterion,
either borrowed directly from common law or created from it,
would then be necessary to adjudge the immunity of the employee. The only criterion available in this historical grab-bag
is some public-private test such as the discretionary-ministerial
distinction. But what does this mean? If, for example, the
courts develop a standard which shields the public employee
from suits in tort when his activity is "discretionary," then both
the public entity and the official will escape liability strictly
because he is involved in the determination and not the implementation of governmental policy.2'8 The same criticisms
leveled at such a distinction in the pre-Evans common law
are again applicable. Any public-private dichotomy employed
by the courts to interpret this vicarious immunity provision
must rest on the traditional assumption that some functions
of government are profoundly more sovereign than others.
See p. 574 supra.
127 This may be difficult to accomplish since the courts have treated the
discretionary-ministerial test for public employee immunity as a subset
of the governmental-nongovernmental test for public entity immunity.
See p. 573 supra.
128 See p. 573 supra.
126
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As observed earlier, such criteria for public liability bear no
rational relationship to the actual responsibility of the defend1 29
ant, nor to the compensability of the plaintiff's injury.
This vicarious immunity of the state impedes the operation
of all specific waivers of immunity under the Act, for the vicarious immunity clause refers to all waivers listed in section 6 of
the Act. Thus, in "abolishing" the governmental-nongovernmental distinction, the general assembly has merely transferred all
the uncertainty and injustice of the pre-Evans common law to
another public-private test, most probably the discretionaryministerial distinction. In short, the pre-Evans quagmire has
been altered in name only.
CONCLUSION

When one compares the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act to the historical common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, a number of common features are apparent. The same
uncertainty and confusion which led to the decision in Evans
has been restored to the law. The same injustices to which the
law had become so acutely sensitive have been recreated. In
the hands of an imaginative and aggressive bar, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in Colorado must again become a judicial
nightmare.
In the past several decades, notions of social loss and "costspreading" have become favored concepts in the law of torts.
Theoretically, the class of society which ultimately benefits
from the risk-producing activity should bear the financial burden of compensating for any losses occasioned by the activity.
These losses are also, in some sense, spread among that class
which can best absorb them. For example, in a field such as
products liability, it is the class of consumers which absorbs the
loss suffered by individual members of the same class. The
price of the product includes the cost of compensating for past
and future losses. Moreover, such spreading is far more efficient,
in the economists' sense of the word, than is leaving the loss to
be absorbed by the injured individual as best he can.
In public liability the arguments are much the same. With
the availability of insurance there is simply no justification for
leaving the burden of loss upon the individual. Such loss is
more efficiently spread through the class of citizens and taxpayers, each paying some minute fraction of total losses as part
of the cost of government. The simple economic and social
pressures which favor the spreading of loss, rather than letting
129

See p. 576 supra.

1973

COMMENT

591

it fall upon an individual incapable of effective "self-compensation," are pressures to which the supreme court in Evans was
surely responding. The development of these pressures and the
court's response to them suggest a higher sense of justice than
that reflected by any continuation of governmental immunity.
On this ground alone the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act must be condemned as a legislative regression.
Rodney R. Patula

